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Average-Cost Pricing and Dynamic Selection Incentives
in the Hospital Sector
Abstract
This study investigates dynamic incentives to select patients for hospitals which are re-
munerated according to a prospective payment system of the DRG type. Using a model with
patients differing in severity within a DRG, we show that price dynamics depend on the ex-
tent of hospital altruism and the relation between patients’ severity and benefit. Upwards
and downwards price movements over time are both possible. In a steady state, DRG prices
are unlikely to give optimal incentives to treat patients. Depending on the level of altruism,
too few or too many patients are treated. DRG pricing may also give incentives to treat
low-severity patients even though high-severity patients should be treated.
Keywords : Hospitals; DRGs; selection; severity.
JEL Classification: I11, I18, L13, L44.
1 Introduction
Prospective payment systems based on Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG) are now in use world-
wide to finance hospitals. They were first introduced in the US to replace cost-based reimburse-
ment rules which were associated with high health care expenditure. In most cases, a fixed tariff
is paid for each patient, creating strong incentives to contain costs.1 Cost efficiency, however, is
only one aspect of the design of payment systems. Prospective payment systems also influence
how and which patients are treated. One problem is that hospitals may save on the quantity and
quality of services (Ellis and McGuire 1986, 1990), in particular if demand is not responsive to
quality.2 This study focuses on the incentives to select patients created by DRG-based payment.
In particular, it has been argued that hospitals have a financial incentive to ‘dump’ patients, ie
to avoid patients whose care requires high spending (Dranove, 1987; Newhouse, 1983).3
Our focus is on DRG payment systems which use average-cost pricing. This is the standard
practice in many countries (Quentin et al., 2011; Cots et al., 2011). An economic justification for
average-cost pricing has been advanced by Shleifer (1985). He argues that this rule is essential in
creating ‘yardstick competition’ between hospitals. It gives each hospital the incentive to invest
efficiently in cost reduction. Prices will then fall to the efficient level, mimicking a competitive
market. However, Shleifer does not consider that hospitals can also influence their cost by
selecting patients.
DRG price adjustment is based on past average costs. The time lag to measure costs is
typically one or two years. Previous literature has abstracted from this adjustment and analyzed
the incentives to select patients in a static framework in which the DRG price is administratively
set. Static models are more tractable but given the dynamic nature of average-cost pricing rule,
we do not know whether the equilibrium described within the static models is actually correct
and analogous to the one obtained in a more realistic dynamic framework. We fill this gap in
1Hospitals receive additional payments only for ‘outliers’ for exceptionally high expenses.
2If demand is responsive to quality, hospitals with poor quality will be penalised by lower revenues (Chalkley
and Malcomson, 1998a; Ma, 1994). For other dimensions of quality, however, further measures may be necessary,
in particular monitoring of standards. Furthermore, cost sharing can be useful in enhancing quality (Chalkley
and Malcomson, 1998b).
3Varying the intensity of service with the severity of a patient is a related strategy (Allen and Gertler, 1991;
Ellis 1998). Hospital may try to overprovide services to low-severity patients (also known as ‘creaming’) and to
underprovide services to high-severity patients (‘skimping’).
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knowledge. Our paper provides the first theoretical analysis of average-cost DRG pricing with
lagged adjustment within a general framework which allows for benefit to increase or reduce
with severity, and with different degrees of altruism.4 Indeed, we show that the dynamic aspects
of the average-cost pricing rule can have a profound effect on the incentives to select patients
over time. We highlight that dumping can get worse over time: dumping reduces the average
cost, which with a lag further reduces the DRG price; in turn, this further reinforces dumping,
and so on until the steady state is achieved. These dynamics are missed by static models
which effectively assume instantaneous adjustment. This case arises if the DRG price leads to
a selection of patients with lower average cost than the DRG price. The opposite case can also
arise. When hospitals are altruistic, they may treat patients with average costs above the DRG
price. The DRG price must rise, reducing dumping. It is even possible that no more patients
are dumped. The dynamics of DRG pricing may start at an interior solution and end up in a
corner solution where patients with all severities are treated. This cannot arise in a static model
where in equilibrium either some or all patients are treated. The analysis therefore highlights
that to properly understand DRG incentives, a dynamic analysis is required. As we do not know
the extent to which hospitals are altruistic, both scenarios with low and high altruism are of
practical relevance. Since the equilibrium within a dynamic framework might differ from a static
one, we provide a welfare analysis and investigate whether DRG pricing gives the incentives to
treat the right patients. Differently from previous literature (reviewed in more detail below)
we highlight the criticality of assuming patients’ benefit (or net benefit) to increase or reduce
with severity. Both scenarios are plausible depending on the treatment. The analysis highlights
that not all scenarios are equally problematic, and refinement of DRG policies needs to take the
specificities of each DRG into account in relation to benefits, costs, altruism and their relation
with severity.
In order to analyze the dynamic selection incentives, we make three key assumptions. Firstly,
we consider that providers are, at least to some extent, altruistic. This assumption is common
in the theoretical health economics literature where it has long been recognised that providers
(doctors and nurses) are concerned about the care provided to patients (Ellis and McGuire,
4See Allen and Gertler (1991), Dranove (1987), Ellis (1998) and Ma (1994).
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1986; Chalkley and Malcomson, 1998b; Jack, 2005; Brekke, Siciliani and Straume, 2011, 2012).5
Secondly, we assume that DRGs do not perfectly capture the expected cost of each patient as
perceived by providers. In particular, asymmetric information between payer and provider puts
constraints on the ability to refine DRGs. Increasing the number of DRGs to better capture
patients’ expected costs can also aggravate the problem of upcoding.
Thirdly, we start from the premise that hospitals are able to select patients. For example,
patients can be rejected by stating that a treatment has little chance of success or by pretend-
ing to have no more capacities. Providers can exploit the asymmetry of information which
characterizes the doctor-patient relation (Arrow, 1963; McGuire, 2000). The assumption is con-
sistent with the extensive empirical clinical variation literature which shows great unexplained
variations in surgery rates across small areas for a number of surgical and medical treatments
(Phelps, 2000). Publicly-funded systems are characterised by large excess demand and pervasive
rationing across and within treatments (Siciliani, 2014). The assumption of patient selection
is in line with previous literature such as De Fraja (2000) and Malcomson (2005) (and the as-
sumption of ‘dumping’ in the seminal paper by Ellis, 1998). Both studies assume that hospitals
are profit maximisers. Given our assumption of altruistic providers, the amount of selection is
less dramatic since altruism broadly weakens, but does not necessarily eliminate, incentives for
selection. None of these papers considers dumping when DRG prices are set at the average cost.
In our model, providers balance the benefit from the DRG price and from the altruistic
motive against the cost of treating a patient. Only patients will be treated for whom these
benefits exceed cost. This defines a ‘marginal patient’ such that the benefit from the DRG
price and from the altruistic motive is equal to the expected cost of treating this patient. Price
dynamics arise if the average cost resulting from the providers’ treatment decisions differs from
the DRG price. Then the price will be adjusted in the next period, giving new incentives for
providers to treat patients.
For non-altruistic hospitals only a downward movement of prices is possible. In this case,
the marginal patient is characterized by cost equal to the DRG price. As long as hospitals treat
5This assumption is also made in the literature on motivated agents in the broader public sector, where the
agent is assumed to share, to some extent, the objective function of the principal (Francois, 2000; Murdock, 2002;
Besley and Ghatak, 2005; Prendergast, 2007).
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patients with different severities, average cost must be lower than the DRG price implying that
it must fall in the next period. Altruistic hospitals, by contrast, are willing to treat patients
which cause losses. Then average cost can be above the DRG price. In this case altruism has a
double effect on patients’ selection. Not only does higher altruism lead to more patients being
treated but with a delay also increases the tariff which further increases the number of patients
treated. In equilibrium, it is possible that all patients are treated.
After investigating hospital incentives under current payment systems, we conduct a welfare
analysis. Here it is decisive whether patients’ benefit decreases or increases with severity. For
instance, if a treatment requires a good physical constitution to recover, patients’ benefit is
likely to decrease with severity. This suggests that patients below a critical severity threshold
should receive treatment. Higher severity can also be associated with higher patients’ benefit,
for example, when higher severity causes higher pain without treatment. Then, it can be optimal
that only high-severity patients are treated.
We find that DRG pricing is unlikely to implement the first-best allocation. The two crucial
factors are the level of altruism and the relationship between patients’ benefit, costs and severity.
Low altruism implies that patients with high severity are dumped even though benefits exceed
costs. With high altruism too many patients are treated. Depending on how patients’ benefit
decreases or increases with severity, either too many high-severity or too many low-severity
patients are treated. Finally, hospitals can have incentives to treat low-severity patients while
it would be optimal from a first-best perspective to treat those with high severity. In this case,
DRG pricing may give completely the wrong incentives. Hospitals treat low-severity patients
while the first-best calls for the treatment of high-severity patients only.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and derive the dynamics of DRG
pricing and equilibrium prices. Section 3 characterises the first-best allocation and evaluates the
outcome of the DRG system. In Section 4, we discuss the implications for empirical analyses
and policy. Section 5 concludes.
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2 The Model
We focus on one DRG. There are N identical hospitals that provide treatment to patients. In
each hospital, patients with a given diagnosis differ in severity of illness s which is distributed
over the support [s, s] with density function f(s) and cumulative distribution function F (s).
We assume that f(s) does not vary with time t. The expected cost of treating a patient with
severity s is c(s), and is increasing in severity, c′(s) > 0.6
A patient’s benefit of hospital treatment is given by b(s). We assume that the benefit is
positive and can increase or decrease with severity, b′(s) ≷ 0. b′(s) > 0 captures the case when a
higher severity is associated also with higher capacity to benefit from treatment because higher
severity causes higher pain without hospital treatment. For example, those with a higher severity
may suffer from higher arthritis pain and benefit more from a hip replacement. b′(s) < 0, by
contrast, can describe a treatment such as a complicated surgery which requires a good physical
constitution to recover. Patients’ severity is observed by providers but not by the payer. Both
scenarios are plausible and likely to vary by DRG.
Patients have a passive role and accept to undertake the care recommended by the provider
(as in Ellis and McGuire, 1986; Ellis, 1998; De Fraja, 2000; Malcomson, 2005). We adopt a
model in discrete time. Hospitals receive a DRG price in each period t which is denoted by
pt for patients with the same diagnosis. The DRG price is set according to the average cost
of all patients who are treated with the same diagnosis in the previous period. We therefore
assume that the pricing rule is exogenously given and that the regulator has committed to this
commonly observed pricing rule (as in Hafsteinsdottir and Siciliani, 2010). We also assume that
N is sufficiently large and can therefore ignore any strategic effect of each individual hospital
choice on future prices.7
Hospitals are risk neutral and partially altruistic. Altruism (or motivation) is captured by
the parameter α with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.8 The provider’s altruistic gain from each patient treatment
6We do not model explicitly incentives to contain costs, eg by introducing a cost-containment effort variable as
in some of the studies cited above. This is because we focus on a purely prospective DRG system. The provider is
residual claimant and will choose optimal cost-containment effort. Therefore, adding such a variable would make
the presentation more complex without adding significant additional insights.
7For small N each hospital may for example strategically admit more severe patients to secure higher prices
in the future.
8We interpret the parameter α as altruism. More generally, this parameter could encompass other sources of
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is αb(s). A selfish provider (α = 0) cares only about the difference between revenues and costs.
In each period the provider treats the patient if pt ≥ c(s)− αb(s), ie if the price at least covers
the ‘net cost’, defined as the expected cost minus the altruistic gain. In an interior solution, the
marginal treated patient has severity st which is implicitly defined by
pt = c(st)− αb(st), (1)
ie the DRG tariff is equal to the marginal net cost. Whether the provider treats low-severity
or high-severity patients under this interior solution depends on specific assumptions about
altruism, the benefit and the cost function.9 Furthermore, we assume that altruistic hospitals
are able to sustain losses for some time. This possibility arises out of equilibrium because
altruistic hospitals are willing to treat high-severity patients who cause losses. In equilibrium,
however, the DRG price equals current average cost and hospitals have a balanced budget.10
In the following we distinguish two different scenarios, increasing and decreasing net cost
with severity over the support [s, s]:11
(I) Net cost increasing with severity: c′(s) − αb′(s) > 0 in [s, s]. In such case, low-severity
patients are treated in an interior solution. This scenario always arises if patient’s benefit
decreases with severity, b′(s) < 0: low-severity patients have lower costs and higher ben-
efits, making these patients attractive for providers both for profit and altruistic reasons.
Hence, providers treat patients with severity below or equal to st in period t (defined in
eq. (1)). This scenario can still arise if patient’s benefit does not vary with severity, or if
it increases with severity and either altruism or the marginal benefit from higher severity
is sufficiently small.
(D) Net cost decreasing with severity: c′(s) − αb′(s) < 0 in [s, s]. In such case, high-severity
patients are treated in an interior solution. This scenario obtains when patients’ benefit
increases with severity and αb′(s) is sufficiently high: although high-severity patients are
motivation, including reputational concerns, peer pressure, and fear of malpractice suits.
9Patients who are not treated by the hospital can still receive some health care outside of the hospital, such
as a drug treatment through the family doctor.
10In Section 2.3, we consider the possibility of losses in more detail.
11These scenarios are not exhaustive as a non-monotonous relation between net cost and severity is also
possible. To keep the exposition focused, we concentrate on the two clear-cut cases.
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more costly, their benefit from treatment (weighted by the degree of altruism) is sufficiently
high that providers have an incentive to treat all patients with severity above st in period
t despite the fact that more severity implies higher treatment costs. This scenario requires
positive altruism.
In the following we discuss the two different scenarios separately, first starting by the case
where providers have an incentive to focus on low-severity patients. We assume that in each
period t, the DRG price is set according to the average cost of the patient treated in the previous
period. We do not consider any hospital-specific DRG price adjustments because we assumed
that all hospitals are identical.
2.1 Scenario I: net cost increasing with severity
In Scenario I the net costs is increasing with severity (with c′(s) − αb′(s) > 0 in [s, s]), and
therefore providers select low-severity patients if they do not treat all patients. Price dynamics
can be examined in a phase diagram in which the variables pt and pt−1 are plotted against each
other (see Figure 1). In Appendix A.1, we formally derive the function pt(pt−1) based on the
average-cost pricing rule. If pt(pt−1) is above the 45
◦ line, the price in t − 1 is below average
cost and the price increases. Conversely, where pt(pt−1) is below the 45
◦ line the price in t− 1
exceeds average cost and must fall in the next period. Equilibria are given by the intersections
of pt(pt−1) with the 45
◦ line.
The minimum price under scenario I which induces providers to treat patients is equal
to the net cost of the patient with lowest severity and thus given by pImin ≡ c(s) − αb(s).
Correspondingly, we define pIall ≡ c(s) − αb(s) as the price above which providers treat all
patients. Such price is equal to the net cost of the patient with highest severity. Furthermore,
we show in Appendix A.1 that the function pt(pt−1) is increasing for intermediate prices p
I
min ≤
pt−1 < p
I
all. This result arises because in scenario I a higher price implies a higher marginal
severity. Providers are therefore willing to treat more costly patients. This increases average
cost and therefore the price in the next period.
Figure 1 displays three possible results depending on the level of altruism.12 The functions
12Figure 1 is based on numerical examples which are detailed in the Appendix.
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Figure 1: Altruism and Price Dynamics
8
start at the minimum price pt(p
I
min) = c(s). Once the price p
I
all is reached, all patients are
treated leading to average cost cµ. We assume an initial price in period 0 above the net cost
of patients with lowest severity, ie p0 ≥ p
I
min, so that some patients are treated in the initial
period. There is always a a unique equilibrium with the equilibrium price p∗.
Let us first consider in Figure 1.a the special case with zero altruism where providers only
maximise profits. In this case, the price function evaluated at the lowest price is on the 45◦
line. For higher prices, pt(pt−1) must be below the 45
◦ line. This is because profit-maximising
providers treat patients only as long as the price covers cost. The cost of the marginal patient
in period t− 1, c(st−1) thus corresponds to pt−1. Average cost of these patients must be below
c(st−1) because cost increases with severity, leading to a lower price in the next period. Thus, in
equilibrium only the lowest severity patients are treated such that s∗ = s and p∗ = pImin = c(s).
The arrows in Figure 1.a. display the price movements for an initial price p0. The DRG
system induces dumping which in the following periods reduces the average cost of treatment
and therefore the DRG price, leading to increased incentives for dumping. Prices converge
to the equilibrium price, implying an almost complete unraveling of the market. This is a
rather negative result. It implies that DRG pricing has the potential to generate a dynamic
development towards the ‘bottom’. Given an initial (high) price, providers have an incentive to
select patients, and treat only those with low severity. This in turn implies that the following
period the price will be lower, which will induce even further selection and reduce marginal
severity, and so on.
Next, we turn to altruistic providers. Figure 1.b illustrates the case with intermediate al-
truism. The price function evaluated at the lowest price pt(p
I
min) is above the 45
◦ line because
hospitals are willing to treat the lowest severity patients at a price below cost c(s). The price
pt(p
I
all) lies below the 45
◦ line. The equilibrium is unique with price p∗ between pImin and p
I
all.
For an initial price p10 below the unique equilibrium p
∗, prices increase over time, for an initial
price p20 above p
∗, prices decrease over time. Although the dynamics is not as extreme as in
Figure 1.a, some selection takes place.
The downward movement of prices in Figure 1.b could reflect the price and selection dy-
namics when cost reimbursement rules are replaced with a DRG system. Under the old regime,
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hospitals have strong incentives to admit patients since expensive patients were simply reim-
bursed. Furthermore, incentives for cost efficiency are low. This implies high average cost and
therefore a high initial DRG price. Thus, falling prices and costs cannot only be explained by
higher cost-containment incentives of the DRG system but also by selection incentives that get
reinforced over time.
Figure 1.b also shows that with altruism, an upward price movement of prices can arise for
sufficiently low initial price. Altruistic providers are willing to treat the lowest-severity patient
even though the price is below cost which corresponds to average cost in this case. In the next
period, the price must increase. Thus, altruism has as a double effect on patients’ selection. Not
only does it lead to more patients being treated but with a delay also increases the tariff which
further increases the number of patients treated.
In Figure 1.c, altruism is high. The price pIall = c(s)−αb(s) for which providers are willing to
treat all patients is therefore low causing the price pt(p
I
all) to be above the 45
◦ line. This implies
that all patients are treated in equilibrium at price p∗ = cµ. Only increasing prices are possible:
since providers’ altruism is high, they are willing to treat patients whose costs are larger than
the DRG price. This in turn implies a higher tariff in the next period which further encourages
providers to treat high-cost patients.
So far, we have only considered cases with an unique equilibrium. Multiple equilibria are
possible. Figure 2 shows an example leading to two stable (A and C) and one instable equilibrium
(B). More than three equilibria are also possible, with the total number being odd and one
more stable equilibrium than unstable equilibrium. With multiple equilibria, both decreasing
and increasing prices are possible depending on the initial price.
The degree of altruism is therefore critical in characterising whether prices are decreasing or
increasing over time. In Appendix A.1.2, we prove the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If the net cost is increasing in severity, there is a unique and stable equilibrium
if
• hospitals are non-altruistic. In this equilibrium, p∗ = c(s) and s∗ = s, ie only patients with
lowest severity are treated. Prices can only be decreasing.
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Figure 2: Multiple Equilibria
• hospital altruism exceeds the critical level αˆ = (c(s) − cµ)/b(s). In this equilibrium, p∗ =
c(s) and s∗ = s, ie all patients are treated. Prices can only be increasing.
For intermediate levels of altruism, there is at least one stable equilibrium in which providers
treat patients up to a severity level s∗ in (s, s]. Depending on the initial price, decreasing or
increasing prices are possible.
Further results on the role of altruism can be obtained by a comparative static analysis.
Interior equilibria are described by the following two equations for equilibrium price and severity,
p∗ and s∗:
p∗ =
∫ s∗(p∗)
s
c(s)f(s)ds
F (s∗(p∗))
, (2)
p∗ = c(s∗(p∗))− αb(s∗(p∗)). (3)
In equilibrium, patients are treated in the interval [s, s∗(p∗)]. Equation (2) simply states that
the DRG equilibrium price must correspond to average cost of these patients. Equation (3)
characterises the equilibrium selection decision by providers. It states that in an interior equi-
librium, price must be equal to the net cost of the marginal patient. Using the right-hand sides,
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we can further characterize the optimal marginal severity s∗ as
αb(s∗) = c(s∗)−
∫ s∗
s
c(s)f(s)ds
F (s∗)
. (4)
In equilibrium, the marginal severity below which patients are treated is defined such that the
benefit from treatment (weighted by altruism) is equal to difference between the marginal cost
and the average cost. Since the cost is increasing in severity, the marginal cost is always above
the average cost (and the price) and the right-hand side of equation (4) is positive.
If providers are profit maximisers, then condition (4) is satisfied only if patients with lowest
severity are treated so that marginal and average cost coincide. Any small positive level of
altruism implies that patients above minimum severity are treated so that the cost of treating
the marginal patient is higher than the average cost. Therefore, a corner solution (with s∗ = s)
cannot arise for positive altruism.
Condition (4) emphasises the critical role played by altruism. Differentiating (4) with respect
to α, we obtain that higher altruism leads to a higher marginal severity starting from a stable
interior equilibrium and to a higher price: ∂s∗/∂α > 0 and ∂p∗/∂α > 0 (Proof in Appendix
A.1.3). Higher altruism implies that providers are willing to treat more severe patients at the
margin. This in turn implies higher cost which translates into a higher price.
Proposition 2 In a stable interior equilibrium, the marginal benefit from treatment weighted
by altruism equates the difference between the marginal and average cost of treatment. The price
and the marginal equilibrium severity, below which patients are treated, increase with altruism.
2.2 Scenario D: net cost decreasing with severity
We now turn to scenario D where the net cost of treating a patient decreases with severity:
c′(s) − αb′(s) < 0. For a given price, assuming they do not treat all patients, providers will
treat high-severity patients. This case can arise only if patient’s benefit increases with severity
(b′(s) > 0) and altruism is sufficiently high.
The minimum price under scenario D which induces providers to treat patients is equal to
the net cost of the patient with highest severity and thus given by pDmin ≡ c(s)−αb(s). Providers
12
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Figure 3: Price Dynamics in Scenario D
will treat all patients for prices exceeding pDall ≡ c(s) − αb(s), the price is equal to the net cost
of the patient with lowest severity. In Appendix A.2, we show that that the function pt(pt−1) is
decreasing for intermediate prices pDmin ≤ pt−1 < p
D
all. This result is in stark contrast to scenario
I when net costs increases with severity. It arises because with net cost increasing with severity,
a higher price reduces the marginal severity. Providers are therefore willing to treat further
patients who have higher net cost, but lower cost. This decreases the average cost and therefore
the price in the next period.
Figure 3 illustrates. The function pt(pt−1) is falling in the range [p
D
min, p
D
all] and then flat.
The unique equilibrium is given by a price equal to the average cost, p∗ = cµ. Price adjustment
is fast. Starting in period 0, consider first the initial price p10. In the next period the price
rises above cµ because providers only treat high-severity patients. This price is above pDall which
implies that all patients are treated in period 1. In period 2, the price is thus p2 = c
µ and the
equilibrium is reached. Price convergence is even faster for an initial price above pDall, eg p
2
0 and
p30. Every patient is therefore treated in period 0. Thus, the price in the following period will be
equal to the average cost pt(p
D
all) = c
µ. The price will remain at this level and the equilibrium
is reached already after one period.
Proposition 3 summarises.
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Proposition 3 If net cost is decreasing with severity, all patients are treated in the unique and
stable equilibrium, and price is equal to the average cost of all patients. Depending on the initial
price, the equilibrium price is reached in one period, or the price first rises and then falls to the
equilibrium price in the second period.
2.3 The role of altruism
The level of altruism plays an important role in our analysis. First, price dynamics depend
crucially on altruism. Low altruism makes a downward movement of prices likely, in particular
if the system starts with a high initial price. With high altruism, the picture is more complex.
An upward movement of prices is now possible in Scenario I. In Scenario D, which requires
both high altruism and patient benefit increasing in severity, the price adjustment can be non-
monotonous. Prices can fall after an initial price rise. In contrast to the case of low altruism, this
price fall is accompanied by an increase in volume as providers extend treatment to low-severity
patients.
Second, altruistic providers are willing to treat patients even though they make losses. In
equilibrium, this case does not arise. However, losses can arise for several periods in the transition
to the equilibrium. This is the case whenever the price is above the 45◦ line in the phase diagram.
In Scenario D, this transition is short. In Scenario I, the speed of adjustment depends on the
slope of the function pt(pt−1). If the slope is small, the equilibrium is quickly reached, if it is
high, transition takes longer. In the Appendix, we show that the slope depends on the properties
of the distribution function of s and on how strongly net costs change with severity (see equation
(A.3)). If c′(s)−αb′(s) is large, pt(pt−1) is flat and the adjustment is fast. If c
′(s)−αb′(s) is small,
the speed of adjustment is slow. In this case, hospitals can come under severe economic strain.
As a consequence, altruistic behavior may be reduced, for example, if hospital management puts
more pressure on physicians. This would shift the function pt(pt−1) downwards and lead to a
faster adjustment.
Finally, an important result is that the equilibrium price can only increase with altruism. We
have shown this for scenario I and confirmed this for scenario D which requires high altruism.
This result is in sharp contrast with what obtained under optimal pricing rules where the
14
regulator can design the optimal price as a function of the parameters at stake, including altruism
(eg Ellis and McGuire, 1986). Under an optimal pricing rule, higher altruism generally implies
a lower price. Intuitively, higher altruism implies that the provider needs less to be incentivised
through prices. When prices are determined by an average-cost rule, by contrast, high altruism
tends to push up prices as providers are willing to treat high-severity patients. This drives up
average costs and, with a lag, prices. To what extent this is in the regulator’s interest will be
discussed in the following section.
3 A Normative Analysis
From a policy perspective, the crucial question is whether price adjustments over time give
providers the incentive to treat the ‘right’ patients. This requires a normative analysis. In the
following, we start from the premise that patients should be treated when benefits are (weakly)
above costs: b(s) ≥ c(s) for s over the support [s, s].13 Again, we distinguish between two
relevant scenarios.
(L) Low-severity patients should be treated in an interior solution. Suppose that patient benefit
is either decreasing with severity or increasing with severity but less steeply than cost:
c′(s)− b′(s) > 0. Assuming an interior solution, the marginal patient is such that b(sf ) =
c(sf ) and patients with severity s below first-best severity sf should receive treatment and
those with severity above sf should not.
(H) High-severity patients should be treated in an interior solution. Suppose that patients
benefit increases with severity more quickly than costs: c′(s) − b′(s) < 0. Then the
marginal patient is still characterised by b(sf ) = c(sf ) but patients with severity above sf
should now be treated. If benefit is higher than cost for all patients over the support [s, s],
then it is optimal to treat all patients.
13We therefore do not consider provider benefit αb(s) for the optimal treatment decision. In this, we follow
Chalkley and Malcomson (1998b) who oppose a double counting of treatment benefits in social welfare calculations.
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Scenarios L and H relate in the following way to scenarios I and D in the last section:
• Scenario L with c′(s)− b′(s) > 0 implies that provider’s scenario I with c′(s)− αb′(s) > 0
holds for any α ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, under scenario L we can ignore provider’s scenario D
because the latter never arises (since c′(s)− αb′(s) < 0 never holds).
• Scenario H with c′(s) − b′(s) < 0 arises only if benefit increases with severity, b′(s) > 0,
and sufficiently steep. Here, on the provider’s side we need to distinguish between scenario
I and D. Provider’s scenario I arises when low altruism implies c′(s) − αb′(s) > 0 and
scenario D when high altruism causes c′(s)− αb′(s) < 0.
3.1 Scenario L: c′(s)− b′(s) > 0. It is optimal to treat low-severity patients
We start by considering scenario L where it is optimal to treat low-severity patients. If c(s) −
b(s) > 0 and c(s)− b(s) < 0, an interior solution arises and it is optimal to treat patients with
severity s ∈ [s, sf ]. Recall that an interior solution obtains in provider’s scenario I if altruism
is below a critical level α̂ (see Proposition 1). In this case, the optimal provider’s equilibrium
severity (see equation (4)) is characterised by
αb(s∗) +
∫ s∗
s
c(s)f(s)ds
F (s∗)
= c(s∗). (4)
When altruism is zero, only patients with lowest severity are treated and s∗ = s < sf . Equilib-
rium severity s∗ increases with altruism, but as long as s∗ < sf too few patients are treated. It
would be optimal from a welfare perspective to treat patients with severities in (s∗, sf ] as well
(see Figure 4, case (a)). At the opposite side of the spectrum, if altruism is high, too many
patients are treated (see Figure 4, case (b)). Comparing the first-best severity characterized by
b(sf ) = c(sf ) with condition (4), this must be the case for α = 1. There are some patients with
high severity that should not be treated but instead are.
We can compute the level of altruism α˜ such that the severity chosen by the provider s∗ is
the same as the first-best severity sf (by using b(sf ) = c(sf ) and condition (4):
α˜ = 1−
∫ sf
s
c(s)f(s)ds
F (sf )
1
c(sf )
< 1.
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s  
(a) Too few patients 
are treated (L/I)
∗
Patients actually  treated
Patients treated under first best
s  
(b) Too many patients 
are treated (L/I)
∗
Patients actually  treated
Patients treated under first best
s  
(c) The wrong patients 
are treated (H/I) ∗
Patients actually  treated
Patients treated under first best
s  
(d) Some patients 
that should not be 
treated are treated (H/I)
∗
Patients actually  treated
Patients treated under first best
s  ∗ = 
(e) Too many patients 
are treated (H/D&I)
Patients actually  treated
Patients treated under first best
Figure 4: Comparison to First-Best Solution
In Appendix A.3, we give numerical examples for each case.
The threshold is equal to one (the highest level of altruism) minus the ratio of the average
and marginal cost of treatment when evaluated at the first-best severity. The ratio between
the average and marginal cost is always below one since the marginal cost is increasing and
low-severity patients are treated. Too few patients are treated for α < α˜, and too many patients
are treated for α > α˜. Only by chance will providers implement the first-best solution.14
14Our results also extend to corner solutions. First, consider that it is optimal to treat all patients. A sufficient
assumption is c(s)− b(s) < 0. Then too few patients will be treated if altruism is below α˜. It is also possible that
a DRG is active even though nobody should be treated. This case applies if c(s) − b(s) > 0. Then individuals
will nevertheless be treated if the initial price is sufficiently high, ie above pImin = c(s)− αb(s).
17
Proposition 4 Suppose that in the first-best solution it is optimal to treat low-severity patients
(c′(s)− b′(s) > 0, c(s)− b(s) > 0 and c(s)− b(s) < 0). Then,
• too few patients are treated for sufficiently low altruism (α < α˜ = 1− AC(s
f )
c(sf )
< 1);
• too many patients are treated for sufficiently high altruism (α˜ < α < 1).
3.2 Scenario H: c′(s)− b′(s) < 0. It is optimal to treat high-severity patients
In this case, high-severity patients should be treated in the first-best solution, ie patients with
severity above sf . If c(s) − b(s) > 0 and c(s) − b(s) < 0, an interior solution arises and it is
optimal to treat patients with severity s ∈ [sf , s].
Recall that this case arises only if benefit increases with severity, ie b′(s) is positive and
sufficiently steep. Here, on the provider’s side we need to distinguish between scenario I and
D. Provider’s scenario I arises when c′(s) − αb′(s) > 0 and scenario D when c′(s)− αb′(s) < 0.
Assuming for simplicity that c′(s)/b′(s) is constant, we can determine a critical level of altruism
←→α ≡ c′(s)/b′(s) such that for α <←→α scenario I arises and above which scenario D arises.
In scenario I, hospitals do not treat high-severity patients when altruism is below the thres-
hold αˆ (see Proposition 1). This is a worrying case since the DRG system gives the wrong
incentives. In Figure 4 case (c), this result is particularly marked as the incentives are completely
wrong. In case (d), for higher altruism, at least some patients are treated who should be treated.
If altruism is above the threshold αˆ in scenario I or if scenario D obtains, all patients are
treated and the DRG system induces too many patients to be treated as in Figure 4 case (e).
The intuition is that altruism is so strong that all are treated (α > αˆ in Scenario I) or that
DRG pricing based on the highest-cost types makes it attractive to treat low-cost types as well
(α >←→α and thus Scenario D).15
15Also for this scenario, it is straightforward to consider corner solutions. It is optimal to treat all patients if
c(s) − b(s) < 0. For sufficiently low altruism, the DRG system will not induce this result. Individuals with high
severity will be dumped. Again, it can happen that a DRG is active even though nobody should be treated. This
case applies if c(s) − b(s) > 0. Providers may nevertheless treat patients. Consider the case of perfect altruism
with α = 1. Then scenario D obtains. If the initial price is at least pDmin = c(s) − b(s), then an equilibrium will
be reached in which all are treated even though b(s) < c(s) for all patients.
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Proposition 5 Suppose that in the first-best solution it is optimal to treat high-severity patients
(b′(s) > 0; c′(s)− b′(s) < 0 and c(s)− b(s) > 0). Then,
• for sufficiently low altruism (α < min{←→α ; αˆ}) there are some patients with low severity
who are treated although benefits are below costs;
• too many patients are treated for sufficiently high altruism (α > min{←→α ; αˆ}).
The analysis assumes so far that the net cost of treatment is either increasing or decreasing
with severity. There may be cases where the net cost is increasing with severity both for low-
severity and high-severity patients, but is decreasing with severity for middle-severity patients.
In such cases, it would be optimal to treat middle-severity patients but not low- and high-severity
patients.
The scenario could arise for example if benefit increases with severity at a decreasing rate
and cost is linear in severity. It is not optimal to treat low-severity patients since benefits are
too low despite the low cost of treatment. Neither it is optimal to treat high-severity patients:
the additional benefit is not offset by the relatively higher costs.
Our normative analysis suggests that DRG payments are particularly problematic when net
cost decreases with severity since patients with high severity should be treated but are not. The
issue remains even under the scenario just described if under the DRG system the provider has
incentive to treat only part of the patients with middle severity, ie those with lower severity
within this group. Our key lessons carry over even if net cost is non-monotonic in severity.
4 Implications for empirical analyses and policy
4.1 Identifying problematic DRGs
Our normative analysis highlights that DRG systems have undesirable properties. In order
to identify problematic DRGs, it is important to determine whether net cost of treatment is
increasing or decreasing with severity. This is where empirical analyses could help regulators.
In this section, we outline potential data and methods.
Cost and benefits of health treatments are regularly measured and employed in economic
evaluations of healthcare treatments to decide whether a new treatment should be provided by a
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public insurer (Drummond et al., 2015). These are generally based on clinical trials on a sample
of patients’ population who need a specific treatment. Benefits can be measured on a continuous
scale, eg through Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs), and converted in monetary terms
through monetary social values. There is therefore a wealth of information that could be used
to compute benefits and costs, and then to relate to appropriate measures of severity. Simply,
for each patient in the sample the net cost of treatment (cost minus benefit) can be computed
and then correlated with severity. Non-linear effects may be accounted for by regressing net
costs with polynomials of severity or by segmenting severity in different bands. This seems in
line with emphasis to provide cost-effective analysis by severity sub-groups (Sculpher and Gafni,
2001; Willan et al., 2004).
Computing net costs by severity for a large number of relevant hospital DRGs is however
not without challenges. Economic evaluations cover only a subset of treatments provided by
hospitals. Moreover, some may be based on relatively small samples raising issues of external
validity. An alternative is to recur to administrative hospital data which cover all patients
treated. A good recent example is Patient Reported Outcomes (PROMs) within the English
National Health Service for four common elective procedures: hip replacement, knee replace-
ment, hernia and varicose veins. These are collected on a routine basis, and measure the health
of the patients before and after the surgery. A measure of benefit from treatment is given by the
health gain, the difference in health (as measured by QALYs or other questionnaire) before and
after the surgery. Severity can be measured by health before surgery or other condition-specific
indicators (eg pain before the surgery). Costs within DRGs could be proxied by length of stay
and transformed into costs by making assumptions about cost of stay per day.
PROMs data although increasingly available are still limited. Hospital administrative data
do provide other health measures, such as in-hospital mortality though these tend to be infre-
quent events and the risk of mortality is negligible for common elective conditions. For the
latter, emergency readmissions rates for different severity sub-groups could be used as proxies of
the benefits. Simple correlations between length of stay and health outcomes might also suggest
whether patients with higher severity, with longer length of stay, are more likely to benefit from
treatment.
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In summary, there are a number of approaches that could be developed to assess whether
the net cost of treatment is increasing or decreasing with severity, or at least for developing an
informed guess about this relation. Current DRG systems currently ignore such information
(with few exceptions such as pay-for-performance schemes for quality). Therefore, moving in
this direction may be beneficial to develop appropriate regulatory interventions.
4.2 Regulatory interventions
Suppose that the regulator can identify whether net cost increases or decreases with severity. In
this section, we discuss possible regulatory interventions. For both scenarios, we can conclude
that the DRG price system with prices based on lagged average cost cannot be expected to give
providers the incentive to treat the ‘right’ patients. In particular, this applies for situations in
which only a fraction of patients should be treated. Only by chance will providers treat only
those patients whose benefits exceed costs. When only high-severity patients should be treated,
the optimal solution can never be implemented.
From a regulatory perspective, corner solutions are not as problematic as interior solutions.
If nobody should be treated, the regulator could simply eliminate a DRG. If all patients should
be treated, altruism may be sufficiently high to induce providers to treat all. Furthermore,
dumping can be severely punished. For interior solutions, by contrast, some patient selection is
optimal and it is difficult for the payer to infer whether the right patients are treated. In this
case one option is to abandon the average-cost rule and to set prices administratively to induce
providers to treat the right patients.
Consider first an interior solution in scenario L in which all patients in [s, sf ] should be
treated. Scenario L implies that providers also prefer low-severity patients. By setting the price
to pf = c(sf ) − αb(sf ), the first-best treatment decision can be induced. However, hospitals
costs and revenue will differ. Consider first that too few patients are treated in equilibrium
(s∗ < sf as in Figure 4 case (a)). Then the regulator must increase the price, eg to p20 in Figure
1(b), creating a positive gap between price and average cost. Excessive profits could be avoided
by making hospitals pay a lump-sum in advance but this can be difficult to implement. If too
many patients are treated in equilibrium (s∗ > sf as in Figure 4 case (b)), the regulator must
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set the price at a lower level, eg price p10 in Figure 1(b). This leads to losses for which hospitals
must be compensated for by lump-sum transfers.
An interior solution in scenario H calls for treatment of all patients in [sf , s]. This solution
can only be implemented by an administrative price pf = c(sf )− αb(sf ) if providers also have
a preference for high-severity patients. This price must be lower than the equilibrium price, eg
price p10 in Figure 3. Hospitals run losses and lump-sum transfers become necessary. If, however,
providers have a preference for low-severity patients, no administrative price can implement the
first-best solution. The regulator’s and providers’ objectives are fundamentally opposed.
These limitations of the price-mechanism in inducing first-best treatment decisions put for-
ward the question whether alternative institutional arrangements can lead to better outcomes.
For DRGs in which the average-cost rule does not lead the right treatment decisions, contract-
ing combined with audits is an alternative. In particular, consider the last case in which the
regulator wants high-severity patients to be treated but providers prefer low-severity patients.
The regulator can specify in a contract that only high-severity should obtain treatment and set
payments equal to average cost of this group. Regular audits check whether hospitals deviate
from this rule. For patients with severity below the specified threshold, no payment is made.
A drawback of this solution is that it causes additional expenditure and administrative burden.
However, this may be justified to ensure that the right patients obtain treatment.
5 Conclusions
This study is the first to investigate hospitals’ dynamic incentives to select patients when prices
are calculated according to the average-cost pricing rule. We considered a range of assumptions
regarding the degree of providers’ altruism and patients’ benefit and cost functions. Previous
studies focused on static incentives to select patients and assumed administratively set DRG
prices. Many countries, however, base their DRG prices on lagged average cost. In our dynamic
framework, we have analyzed how this pricing rule influences providers’ incentives over time.
We showed that hospitals’ dynamic incentives to select patients depend on the degree of
providers’ altruism and the relation between patients’ severity and its benefit. For sufficiently
low altruism, the incentive to avoid expensive patients with high severity may be reinforced over
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time until a steady-state is reached, leading to a dynamic development towards the ‘bottom’.
The introduction of a DRG price system generates incentives to dump patients which implies
an even lower price in the future period which further encourages selection and dumping and
so on. For a stable steady-state equilibrium, we showed that higher altruism leads to higher
equilibrium prices. This is in sharp contrast with what obtained under optimal pricing rules
where the optimal price reduces with altruism (Ellis and McGuire, 1986).
An upward movement of prices is also possible. Altruistic providers may treat patients whose
costs are much larger than the DRG price. This in turn implies with a delay a higher DRG tariff
which encourages providers to treat further high-cost patients. This mechanism can reinforce
an equilibrium with no dumping. If altruism is high and patient benefit increases with severity,
another pattern can arise. Providers prefer to treat high-severity patients and prices can then
first rise. This creates incentives to extend treatment to low-severity patients and prices fall
again.
Our dynamic analysis provides an explanation for downwards or upwards DRG price move-
ments over time. Whether volume of treatment follows the price depends on the scenario. If
providers have a preference for treating low-severity patients, lower prices are associated with a
lower volume of treatment. If provider prefer to treat high-severity patients, however, a price fall
is accompanied by an increase in volume as providers extend treatment to low-severity patients.
Welfare implications of current DRG systems have also been derived. We assumed that
patients should be treated if benefits exceed costs and compared this to the equilibrium of
the DRG system. Based on this benchmark, we determined to what extent the DRG system
gives incentives to treat the ‘right’ patients. We considered interior solutions in which only a
fraction should be treated. We found that the optimal treatment decision is only implemented
by chance. Both providers and the regulator must have a preference for the treatment of low-
severity patients and altruism must be neither too low or too high. Otherwise severe deviations
can arise:
• If patients’ benefit decreases with severity, low altruism causes too few patients to be
treated.
• For high altruism, the problem is that too many (either of high-severity or of low-severity)
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patients are treated.
• When patients’ benefit increases with severity (for example higher severity causes higher
pain without treatment), then DRG pricing can lead to low-severity patients being treated
even though high-severity patients should be treated. In the extreme, no patient is treated
who should be treated.
While the incentives created by DRGs to dump patient are generally recognized, these results
show that the problem is more complex. Dumping of high-severity patients which should be
treated is only one possibility. DRG systems can also create incentives to treat high-severity
patients which should not be treated. An example are complicated surgeries which can be very
costly for patients in otherwise poor health state and should therefore be limited to individuals
with low severity. Overall, our analysis shows that a DRG system in which prices are calculated
according to the average-cost pricing rule cannot be expected to give the right incentives to treat
patients.
We have discussed several approaches that could be developed to assess whether the net cost
of treatment is increasing or decreasing with severity. This would allow to identify problematic
DRGs. For these cases, an option is to use administrative prices. Then, however, costs and
revenue will differ. The regulator must either require hospitals to pay a lump-sum to avoid
excessive profits or pay lump-sum transfers to cover losses. This solution, however, is infeasible,
if the regulator wants high-severity patients to be treated but providers have a preference for
low-severity cases. Then an alternative is to contract hospitals for the treatment of high-severity
patients and to audit regularly whether hospitals comply.
Our key assumption is that hospitals decide about treatment. In practice, there are lim-
itations to this rule when it comes to the ‘dumping’ of patients. For example, patients may
protest against not receiving treatment. Nevertheless, patients can be rejected by stating that a
treatment has little chance of success or by pretending to be operating above capacity. Hospitals
can be expected to meet less resistance when too many patients are treated. In our model, we
assumed that all patients receive positive benefits from treatment and are therefore unlikely to
protest if they get treated even though costs exceed benefits.
Our model makes a number of simplifying assumptions. First, we have not allowed explicitly
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for the presence of capacity constraints. These may be relevant for health systems with lower
spending and limited resources, which translate into excess demands. In such countries, one
natural response would be for the regulator of the DRG system to set a lower price. Indeed,
given a capacity constraint, the regulator can always set within our model a regulated price
which is low enough to discourage providers to admit too many treatments. An alternative way
to think about the role of capacity constraints is in terms of its impact on the cost structure.
Hospitals with a more binding capacity constraints (given for example by a fixed number of
beds) effectively face a higher marginal (monetary or non-monetary) cost of treating patients at
the margin. Within our model, this would imply a higher marginal cost of treating a patient for
a given severity, which in turn will reduce the number of patients who are treated in equilibrium
(see Brekke et al., 2011, for an analogous approach). The cost function we adopt is general. We
therefore conjecture that the key insights of our model will not be altered by larger marginal
costs induced by tighter capacity constraints.
Second, providers are assumed to be homogeneous. This is for tractability reasons and in
line with many theoretical models in the health economics literature. Introducing heterogeneity
in costs across hospitals would make the model more realistic and generate additional results
at the cost of greater analytical complexity but would not alter the key insights in terms of
price dynamics and welfare properties. Hospitals with higher costs will treat fewer patients in
equilibrium but will decide to choose high- or low-severity patients along the lines illustrated
by the model. The problem for the regulator becomes more involved. The regulator would
need to decide whether to allow for differential prices for hospitals with different cost structure.
Its design is likely to depend on the degree of asymmetric information on costs and other
institutional constraints (Miraldo et al., 2011).
Third, we have assumed that providers can select or dump patients. Our model does not
allow for quality differences across patients, where providers could potentially skimp on high-
severity patients by providing lower quality or cream-skim low-severity patients by providing
higher quality to these patients (in line with Ellis, 1998). The extent to which hospitals have
an incentive to differentiate quality across patients within a DRG is likely to depend on how
different severity groups can observe quality differences and are able to respond to it. In our
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model, such incentives would be mitigated by the presence of altruism. Moreover, the empirical
literature suggests that demand responsiveness to quality remains low (Brekke et al., 2014).
This implies that incentives to skimp on quality may be pervasive in DRG payments system,
and may need to be countervailed by other mechanisms such as pay-for-performance schemes
or quality audits and inspections. The incentives to skimp or cream-skim, if present, are driven
by the profit margin on each patient. Our model highlights the dynamics generated by price
setting based on past costs. When price increases over time, the incentives to skimp are likely
to be diluted, and instead strengthened by period reductions in price.
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Appendix
A.1 Scenario I
A.1.1 Derivation of the first-order difference equation
In this scenario, providers select low-severity patients. The average cost in period t−1 and thus
the DRG price in period t is equal to
pt =
∫ st−1(pt−1)
s
c(s)f(s)ds
F (st−1(pt−1))
≡ g(pt−1), (A.1)
where F (st−1(pt−1)) =
∫ st−1(pt−1)
s
f(s)ds is the number of patients treated in the previous period
and st−1(pt−1) is the marginal severity in the previous period t − 1. It is defined by pt−1 =
c(st−1) − αb(st−1) and determined by the price in the previous period pt−1. The pricing rule
is therefore recursive since the price in period t depends on the price in period t − 1, which is
captured more succinctly by the function pt = g(pt−1). We define p
I
min ≡ c(s) − αb(s) as the
minimum price under scenario I which induces providers to treat patients, which is equal to the
net cost of the patient with lowest severity. Similarly, we define pIall ≡ c(s)− αb(s) as the price
under scenario I above which providers treat all patients. Such price is equal to the net cost of
the patient with highest severity. If the price is above such level, ie pt−1 ≥ p
I
all, then equation
(A.1) implies that the price in the following period is equal to the average cost when all patients
are treated cµ ≡
∫ s
s
c(s)f(s)ds. Increasing net costs, c′(s)− αb′(s) > 0, imply that the net cost
of the patient with highest severity is higher than the net cost of the patient with lowest severity
so that pImin < p
I
all.
For prices pt−1 in the intermediate range [p
I
min, p
I
all), the price dynamics follows equation
(A.1) which is a non-linear first-order difference equation. Price dynamics can therefore be
summed up in
pt(pt−1) =


cµ if pt−1 ≥ p
I
all
g(pt−1) if p
I
min ≤ pt−1 < p
I
all.
(A.2)
For intermediate prices pImin ≤ pt−1 < p
I
all, we can implicitly differentiate the function
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g(pt−1) defined by (A.1). Using (1), we obtain
dpt
dpt−1
=
f(st−1(pt−1))
F (st−1(pt−1))

c(st−1(pt−1))−
∫ st−1(pt−1)
s
c(s)f(s)ds
F (st−1(pt−1))

 1
c′(s)− αb′(s)
. (A.3)
The term in the square brackets in equation is positive since the cost of the marginal patient is
always higher than the average cost (recall that net cost is increasing in severity). Furthermore,
c′(s)− αb′(s) > 0 by assumption. Thus, dpt/dpt−1 is strictly positive for p
I
min ≤ pt−1 < p
I
all.
The equilibria that correspond to Figures 1.a to 1.c are based on linear benefits and costs
functions: b(s) = b0 + b1s, c(s) = c0 + c1s with c0 > 0, c1 > 0, b0 > 0. Patients’ severity
is distributed over the support [s, s] with the uniform density function with a mass of one,
f(s) = 1, (implying s − s = 1). Under scenario I we have c′(s) − αb′(s) > 0 and therefore
c1 − αb1 > 0. This is always satisfied when b1 < 0 but also if b1 > 0 and altruism is sufficiently
low, ie α < α˜ ≡ c1/b1. Condition (1) which defines the marginal treated patients corresponds
to pt = c0 + c1st − α (b0 + b1st), implying st =
pt+αb0−c0
c1−αb1
. Using (A.1), DRG pricing implies
pt = c0 +
c1(st−1+s)
2 . Substituting st−1, we obtain the linear function:
g(pt1) =
A
2 (c1 − αb1)
+
c1
2 (c1 − αb1)
pt−1
with A ≡ sc1(c1 − αb1) + c0c1 + α (c1b0 − 2b1c0) . Moreover, p
I
min ≡ (c0 + c1s) − α (b0 + b1s),
pIall ≡ (c0 + c1s) − α (b0 + b1s) and c
µ ≡ c0 + c1
(s+s)
2 . Due to the linearity, there is always a
unique equilibrium for p0 ≥ p
I
min. For the interior equilibrium which holds for 0 < α < αˆ =
c1/[2(b0 + b1s)], we obtain p
∗ = A
c1−2αb1
, s∗ = sc1+2αb0
c1−2αb1
. Overall, we find:
(a) For α = 0, we have p∗ = c(s), s∗ = s.
(b) For 0 < α < αˆ = c1/[2(b0 + b1s)], we have an interior equilibrium with p
∗ = A
c1−2αb1
, s∗ =
sc1+2αb0
c1−2αb1
.
(c) For α ≥ αˆ, we have p∗ = cµ, s∗ = s.
Figures 1.a to 1.c are based on b1 = 0, b0 = c1 = 1, c0 = 0.5, s = 0 and α ∈ {0, 0.25, 0.75}.
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A.1.2 Proof of Proposition 1
To characterise the solution, it is crucial whether the kink in the function pt(pt−1) is above or
below the 45◦ line. It is below if pt(p
I
all) = c
µ < pIall = c(s)− αb(s), ie when the average cost of
treating all patients is lower than the net cost of treating the patient with highest severity. We
therefore find that decreasing prices are possible (for a sufficiently high initial price) if and only
if
pt(p
I
all) = c
µ < pIall = c(s)− αb(s) ⇔ α < αˆ ≡
c(s)− cµ
b(s)
> 0, (A.4)
where αˆ is critical level of altruism below which not all patients are treated in equilibrium and
prices can be decreasing if the initial price is sufficiently high. For altruism above αˆ, prices can
only increase until they reach the highest possible level, ie the average cost of all patients. In
Figure 1.a and 1.b, altruism is below αˆ. Figure 1.c shows the case of high altruism α ≥ αˆ. The
unique stable equilibrium is given by p∗ = cµ and everybody is treated.
A.1.3 Comparative statics with respect to α
Differentiating (4) with respect to α, we obtain
∂s∗
∂α
=
b(s∗)
−
[
αb′(s∗)− c′(s∗) + f(s
∗)
F (s∗)
(
c(s∗)−
∫ s∗
s
c(s)f(s)ds
[F (s∗)]
)] .
The stability condition requires
dpt
dpt−1
∣∣∣∣
s∗
=
f(s∗)
F (s∗)

c(s∗)−
∫ s∗
s
c(s)f(s)ds
F (s∗)

 1
− [αb′(s)− c′(s)]
< 1,
which implies that the denominator in ∂s
∗
∂α
is positive. Moreover,
∂p∗
∂α
=
f(s∗)
F (s∗)

c(s∗)−
∫ s∗
s
c(s)f(s)ds
[F (s∗)]

 ∂s∗
∂α
> 0.
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A.2 Scenario D
Since now patients in the interval [st−1, s] are treated, the DRG price in period t is given by
pt =
∫ s
st−1(pt−1)
c(s)f(s)ds
1− F (st−1(pt−1))
≡ h(pt−1), (A.5)
where 1− F (st−1(pt−1)) =
∫ s
st−1(pt−1)
f(s)ds is the number of patients treated and st−1(pt−1) is
the marginal severity in the previous period t− 1, defined by αb(st−1) + pt−1 = c(st−1).
As above, we define the minimum price which induces providers to treat some patients.
Because in this case providers have a preference for high-severity patients, the price in scenario
D is given by pDmin ≡ c(s) − αb(s), which is the net cost of treating the patient with highest
severity. Furthermore, we define pDall ≡ c(s) − αb(s) as the price above which providers treat
all patients, which is equal to the net cost of treating the patient with lowest severity. The
assumption c′(s)− αb′(s) < 0 implies that pDmin < p
D
all. If pt−1 ≥ p
D
all, the price in the following
period is equal to the average cost when all patients are treated, cµ =
∫ s
s
c(s)f(s)ds.
For intermediate prices pt−1 in [p
D
min, p
D
all), the price dynamics follow the non-linear first-order
difference equation (A.5) which implicitly defines the function pt = h(pt−1). Price dynamics can
therefore be summed up in
pt(pt−1) =


cµ if pt−1 ≥ p
D
all
h(pt−1) if p
D
min ≤ pt−1 < p
D
all.
(A.6)
For intermediate prices pDmin ≤ pt−1 < p
D
all, we can implicitly differentiate (A.5). Using (1), we
obtain
dpt
dpt−1
= −
f(st−1(pt−1))
1− F (st−1(pt−1))

c(st−1(pt−1))−
∫ s
st−1(pt−1)
c(s)f(s)ds
1− F (st−1)

 1
c′(s)− αb′(s)
. (A.7)
The term in the square brackets in equation (A.7) is negative since the cost of the marginal
patient is lower than the average cost. Furthermore, c′(s) − αb′(s) < 0 by assumption. Thus,
dpt/dpt−1 is strictly negative for p
D
min ≤ pt−1 < p
D
all and a higher price in a period decreases the
price in the next period.
33
The equilibrium corresponding to Figure 3 is based on linear benefit and cost functions and a
uniform density function as above. Scenario D arises if αb1 > c1 or, equivalently, α > α˜ ≡ c1/b1.
Patients are treated if α (b0 + b1st)+ pt ≥ c0+ cst, leading to st =
c0−αb0−pt
αb1−c1
. Using (A.5), DRG
pricing implies pt = c0 +
c1(s+st−1)
2 . Thus, we obtain the linear function h(pt−1) = c0 +
c1s
2 +
c1(c0−αb0)
2(αb1−c1)
− c12(αb1−c1)pt−1, with p
D
min = c0 + c1s− αb0 − αb1s, p
D
all = c0 + c1s− αb0 − αb1s, and
cµ ≡ c0+c1 (s+ s) /2. In equilibrium, we have a corner solution with s
∗ = s and p∗ = c0+
c1(s+s)
2 .
Noting that α˜ = c1
b1
> αˆ = c12(b0+b1s) , all patients are treated in this equilibrium. To draw Figure
3, we have used b0 = b1 = 2, c1 = 1, c0 = 1.5, s = 0 and α = 0.6.
A.3 Examples for Figure 3.1
As in our other examples, we assume that benefit and cost is linear in severity, the density
function is uniform and that the provider has an interior solution. Scenario L arises if c1 > b1
and b0 > c0, so that s
f = b0−c0
c1−b1
. Scenario I applies with s∗ = sc1+2αb0
c1−2αb1
. Using the parameter
values b1 = 0, b0 = c1 = 1, c0 = 0.5, s = 0, we obtain s
f = 0.5 and s∗ = 2α. Thus, α˜ = 0.25.
For α = 0.2, we have s∗ = 0.4 and case (a) obtains. α = 0.4 implies s∗ = 0.8 and therefore
case (b). Scenario H arises if b1 > c1 and c0 > b0, so that s
f = c0−b0
b1−c1
, and ←→α ≡ c1/b1. If
α > c1
b1
then scenario D arises and s∗ = s. If α < c1/b1 then scenario I arises and s
∗ = sc1+2αb0
c1−2αb1
if 0 < α < α̂ = c12(b0+b1s) and s
∗ = s if α̂ < α < ←→α where ←→α > α̂. Using the parameter values
b0 = b1 = 2, c1 = 1, c0 = 2.5, s = 0, we obtain s
f = 0.5, αˆ = 0.125 and ←→α = 0.5. Scenario I
with s∗ = 4α1−4α holds for 0 < α < 0.125, scenario D with s
∗ = s for α > 0.125. The figures (c)
to (e) correspond to α ∈ {0.05, 0.1, 0.2} with s∗ ∈ {0.25, 0.67, 1}.
34
